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DOES THE JUDICIARY HAVE THE TOOLS FOR
REGULATING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS?
Victor E. Schwartz,* Phil Goldberg** & Christopher E. Appel***
I. INTRODUCTION
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,1 the Supreme Court of
the United States spoke for the first time regarding the propriety of using
common law tort actions to regulate greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions
in the United States. Eight state attorneys general, the City of New York,
and several land trusts claimed a federal common law right of action
against private and public energy companies to remedy alleged injuries
associated with the “public nuisance” of global climate change.2 A
unanimous Court rejected the claim.3 It held that the appropriate path
for regulating GHG emissions is through the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) acting pursuant to congressional authority and that,
through the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), Congress had displaced any federal
common law action seeking to limit GHG emissions.4 The Court did not
stop there. It also stated that there is “no room for a parallel track” of
tort litigation and issued a broad warning against global climate change
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1
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
2
See id. at 2531–32.
3
The Court rendered an 8–0 decision. See id. at 2531. Justice Sotomayor did not
participate in the decision. Id.
4
Before the American Electric Power Co. decision, the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held
that the CAA authorized the EPA to regulate emissions of four gases commonly
characterized as GHGs, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007), and that the EPA arbitrarily abdicated its
statutory authority to do so in denying rulemaking, id. at 534; see infra Part II.B.1
(discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts).
*
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litigation.5 It said the judiciary, given its limited tools, does not have the
institutional competence to determine “[t]he appropriate amount of
regulation” for sources of carbon dioxide given the impact such a
decision would have on the “energy needs” of the American people.6
Despite the strong sentiments the Court expressed in American Power
Electric Co., commentators favoring climate change litigation have tried
to limit the reach of the Court’s opinion. Their main arguments fit into
three categories. First, they state that the Court’s displacement ruling
did not bar this case or any other climate change tort suit from
proceeding under a state’s common law.7 While the Court acknowledged
its opinion focused only on federal common law claims, the state claims
had been dropped from the case earlier in the proceedings.8 Second,
they argue that common law tort suits that can be distinguished from the
precise construct of American Electric Power Co. can proceed, including
those brought by other types of plaintiffs or that seek other types of
relief. Third, they say the Court’s 4–4 split on the two constitutional
questions—whether state attorneys general had constitutional standing
to bring their claims and whether judicial remedies to limit fossil fuel
emissions present innate political questions—was a victory for them.9
They assert the split means there are no constitutional obstacles barring
the judiciary from hearing any tort-based claim alleging that any
defendant can be subject to liability for harms allegedly caused by global
climate change.
This Article addresses each of these arguments, focusing on the legal,
public policy, and practical considerations the Court raised in American

Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
Id. at 2539.
7
The Court reasoned “that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel
fired power plants.” Id. at 2537. The Court distinguished this analysis from a finding that
the CAA preempted any state tort action in this area, and left the decision open on the
availability of such remedies for further consideration on remand. Id. at 2540; see infra Part
II.B (examining the progress of climate change litigation from Massachusetts to American
Electric Power Co.).
8
The plaintiffs in American Electric Power Co. had sought relief under state law where
the defendants operate power plants, but because the Second Circuit ruled that the federal
common law claim governed the case and “[n]one of the parties have briefed preemption
or otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law,” the Supreme
Court did not address the state claims. 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
9
See id.; Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change
Regulation: Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447, 451 (2012) (“The most
important jurisprudential issues raised in the [American Electric Power Co.] appeal are
standing . . . and the political question doctrine.”).
5
6
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Electric Power Co.10 (In an article published before American Electric Power
Co. was decided, we investigated the doctrinal issues with using the tort
of public nuisance to regulate GHG emissions.11) Part II of the Article
begins the discussion by putting global climate change litigation into
context. First, the Article contextualizes the regulation of GHGs within
the historical, multi-faceted development of U.S. energy policy.12 It
explains the complexity of focusing in isolation on any single
component, no matter its importance, of the nation’s energy policy.13
Second, it puts American Electric Power Co. into the context of other
lawsuits seeking to have courts determine America’s energy policy based
solely on environmental allegations with fossil fuels.14 Part III focuses on
the message the Court delivered in American Electric Power Co.,
discussing what the Court’s ruling means for other climate change
cases.15 Part IV analyzes the public policy consequences and “real
world” impacts of isolating and establishing GHG emission limits
through the judiciary.16
The Article concludes that federal and state judiciaries, given their
institutional constraints, do not have the capabilities to establish GHG
emission limits in an effective, consistent, and nondiscriminatory
manner. It also shows that the Supreme Court, in American Electric Power
Co., provided a blueprint and broad mandate for state and federal courts
to reject any claim that would “regulate” GHG emissions.
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO U.S. ENERGY
POLICY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE TORT LITIGATION
A. Regulating GHGs as Part of the Development of U.S. Energy Policy
Since the Industrial Revolution, energy and, as a result, energy
policy have become integral to American social and political landscapes.
American society requires energy sources to fuel many aspects of daily
life, from electrifying homes and businesses, to enabling transportation
The Court in American Electric Power Co. expressly cautioned that it “endorse[d] no
particular view of the complicated issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate
change.” 131 S. Ct at 2533 n.2.
11
See Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Corey Schaecher, Why Trial Courts Have Been
Quick to Cool “Global Warming” Suits, 77 TENN. L. REV. 803, 834 (2010).
12
See infra Part II (examining the development of the U.S. energy policy and global
warming cases in a judicial context).
13
See infra Part II.A (discussing the national energy policy and regulation of GHGs).
14
See infra Part II.B (discussing tort law allegations in courts regarding GHG limits).
15
See infra Part III (analyzing the Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. and its
effect on global climate change law).
16
See infra Part IV (examining the real world effects and the public policy concerns of the
Court’s decision).
10
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and so much more.17 As the population has grown and technology has
flourished, the need for energy has steadily increased. Over the past
sixty years, energy consumption has tripled,18 and by 2035, U.S. energy
consumption is projected to increase by another fifteen percent.19
Traditionally, the focal point of American energy policy has been to
assure a continuous, affordable supply of energy to satisfy this demand.
Recent brown-outs in California and spikes in gasoline above four
dollars per gallon have demonstrated the personal and economic
hardships that can result when aspects of U.S. energy policy fail, even for
a short period of time. Accordingly, for more than a hundred years,
lawmakers have prioritized energy sources that are capable of large scale
production and are relatively inexpensive and relatively safe. Those
sources have consisted primarily of fossil fuels, namely coal, oil, and
natural gas.20 Together, these fuels account for eighty-three percent of
U.S. energy production.21 Any change in America’s energy policy
involving these fossil fuels, therefore, must fully consider the impact that
change would have on the ways the United States produces and uses
energy, including the affordability of electricity and gasoline for
American consumers, the nation’s global competiveness, foreign policy
Concerns of
dynamics, and national security interests.22
environmentalists, including over GHG emissions represent only one
17
See Rick Strange, Weaving A Tangled Web: The Intersection of Energy Policy and Broader
Government Policies, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 3 (2009) (stating that “Americans
devour energy prodigiously” and “[b]ecause we consume so much energy, ensuring our
access to it is a vital national concern”).
18
See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_energy_use (last updated July
20, 2011).
19
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0484, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2010 (2010), available at www.eia.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html.
20
See Mark Clayton, ‘Fracking’: Did Energy Department Report Clear Up Controversy?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 11, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 15949774 (discussing the
“dramatic rise” in natural-gas production “from about [two] percent of America’s gas
supply a decade ago to about [thirty] percent today” as a result of “fracking”
advancements); Peter S. Glaser, F. William Brownell & Victor E. Schwartz, Managing Coal:
How to Achieve Reasonable Risk with an Essential Resource, 13 VERMONT ENVTL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 11) (on file with authors) (detailing the major risks of
mainstream energy sources).
21
See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, supra note 18.
22
See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also Control of Emissions
from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003)
(stating EPA position that “climate change raises important foreign policy issues”); Leon
Fuerth, Energy, Homeland, and National Security, in ENERGY & SECURITY: TOWARD A NEW
FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY 411 (Jan H. Kalicki & David L. Goldwyn eds., 2005) (discussing
relationship between energy costs and national security interests).
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aspect of the U.S. energy policy and must be integrated into this
kaleidoscope.
1.

Environmentalism as a Factor in U.S. Energy Policy

In the 1970s, policy issues relating to emissions of carbon dioxide
and other GHGs reached the national dialogue. This occurred at the
same time the environmental political movement secured significant
legislative victories.23 During that decade, Congress passed seminal
pieces of environmental legislation, namely the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”),24 the CAA,25 and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).26
These statutes, although not directly addressing energy production or
policy, established that the assessment of environmental impacts would
have to be a factor in developing national policies for a range of areas.27
Legislation specifically addressing environmental impacts of energy
production and use soon emerged. In 1975, Congress established
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards for automotive
vehicles sold in the United States.28 The EPA was authorized to set
CAFE standards at the “maximum feasible level” considering, among
other things, “[t]echnological feasibility,” “[e]conomic practicability,”

23
See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United States,
20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 76 (2001).
24
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4327 (2006)). In the late 1990s, and continuing
into the 2000s, various groups have used the NEPA to “assert[] climate change claims.”
Kevin T. Haroff, On Thin Air: Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental Policy
Act, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 411, 414 (2012).
25
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407–7642 (2006)); see History of the Clean Air Act, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/caa_history.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2010).
The
precursor to the CAA was the Air Pollution Control Act. Id.; see Air Pollution Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q
(2006)). It funded research into the scope and sources of air pollution. History of the Clean
Air Act, supra. The initial CAA was passed in 1963, establishing a national program to
address air pollution within the U.S. Public Health Service and authorizing additional
research into techniques for monitoring and controlling air pollution. Id. It was
significantly amended in 1970 to include substantive provisions and has been subsequently
amended, most notably in 1977 and 1990. Id.
26
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
27
See Mark Latham, Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Intersection of Tort
and Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737,
742–46 (2011) (discussing the seminal environmental legislation enacted in the 1970s).
28
See CAFE—Fuel Economy, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy (last visited
Sept. 29, 2011).
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and the national “[n]eed . . . to conserve energy.”29 These standards have
increased gradually over time, encouraging more fuel efficient vehicles.30
Congress has followed a similar incremental approach with regard
to global climate change allegations. The initial focus was on learning.
In 1978, Congress established a “national climate program” to increase
general knowledge “through research, data collection, assessments,
information dissemination, and international cooperation.”31 In 1980,
Congress commissioned a National Academy of Sciences study through
the Energy Security Act to analyze the “projected impact, on the level of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, of fossil fuel combustion, coalconversion and related synthetic fuels activities.”32 In 1990, Congress
enacted the Global Changes Research Act to establish a ten-year research
program for global climate issues.33
This learning phase has given way to two decades of strategic
initiatives toward reducing GHG emissions. Domestically, Congress has
focused on a multi-disciplinary approach, enacting numerous subsidies
and tax incentives aimed at two goals: to modernize fossil fuel
production to reduce GHG emissions and to spur development of
alternative energy sources that emit fewer GHGs.34 For example, in his
2010 State of the Union speech, President Obama said that his national

See CAFE Overview—Frequently Asked Questions, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/
cars/rules/cafe/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
30
See Nelson D. Schwartz, American Energy Policy, Asleep at the Spigot, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 6,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/business/06oil.html?pagewanted=all
(“Between 1974 and 1989, the efficiency of a typical car sold in the United States almost
doubled, to 27.5 miles per gallon from 13.8.”).
31
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,927 (Sept. 8, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32
Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, § 711(a)(1), 94 Stat. 611, 774 (1980).
33
15 U.S.C. §§ 2931−2939 (2006).
34
See, e.g., Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010)
(proposing a cap and trade program to reduce GHG emissions by eighty-three percent in
2050); American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)
(proposing a comprehensive cap and trade program); Safe Climate Act of 2006, H.R. 5642,
109th Cong. (2006) (proposing amendments to the CAA to achieve two percent annual
reductions in GHGs between 2010 and 2050); Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S.
3698, 109th Cong. (2006) (providing a comprehensive set of amendments to the CAA aimed
at reducing GHGs). Members of Congress have also sponsored bills that would assist state
efforts to reduce GHGs. See PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 5766, 111th
Cong. (2010) (proposing to amend Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac underwriting standards to
support state clean energy loan programs); PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010, S.
3642, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing a plan identical to the plan set forth in H.R. 5766); H.R.
3836, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a DOE credit program “to enhance the availability of
private financing for clean energy technology deployment”).
29
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energy policy includes continued investment in clean coal technology.35
He subsequently issued a presidential memorandum instructing federal
officials to work toward “[r]apid commercial development and
deployment of clean coal technologies” that “will help position the
United States as a leader in the global clean energy race.”36 With regard
to alternative and renewable energy sources, about a third of the cost of
solar and wind energy is paid for through subsidies and tax incentives.
Together, wind, solar, biomass, hydroelectric power, and other
alternative energy sources account for about eight percent of U.S. energy
production and continue to expand.37
Internationally, presidential administrations of both political parties
have sought to develop a global international consensus on approaches
to GHGs. American policymakers have been keenly aware that any
unilateral action on GHG emissions would significantly and
disproportionately increase the cost of energy in the United States. For
example, in 1992, President George H. W. Bush signed the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),
which was a nonbinding agreement between 154 nations designed to
reduce atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other GHGs in
order to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
[Earth’s] climate system.”38 UNFCCC member nations negotiated the
Kyoto Protocol that called for mandatory reductions of GHG emissions
of developed nations.39
35
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-unionaddress. President Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush, also supported development of
clean coal technology. See, e.g., Robin Acton, Bush Urges Clean Coal Technology for Electricity,
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/
news/s_580555.html.
36
Press Release, The White House, Presidential Memorandum—A Comprehensive
Federal Strategy on Carbon Capture and Storage (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-a-comprehensivefederal-strategy-carbon-capture-and-storage.
37
See What is Energy? Explained: Sources of Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=about_sources_of_energy
(last
updated July 27, 2011). These sources, including biofuels, wind, solar, and hydroelectric
power cannot power base-load electricity plants or broadly fuel the transportation
industry. See C. Boyden Gray & Andrew R. Varcoe, Octane, Clean Air, and Renewable Fuels:
A Modest Step Toward Energy Independence, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 9, 12–15 (2005); Blair H.
Moses, The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007: Can Biotechnology Help Overcome
Potential Obstacles to Meeting Its Energy Goals?, 3 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
41, 56–59 (2010).
38
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
39
Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 22.
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In 1997, President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol, but did not
present it for ratification to the U.S. Senate, which expressed concern that
the economic burdens of reducing carbon dioxide emissions would fall
on industrialized nations.40 Subsequently, President George W. Bush
opposed the Kyoto Protocol, stating that it exempted developing nations,
did not include two major types of pollutants, and would have had a
significant negative economic impact on the United States.41 President
Obama participated in the Copenhagen Climate Conference that
considered renewing the Kyoto Protocol, which is set to expire in 2012,
and encouraged all nations to reduce GHG emissions. The conference
resulted in a limited, non-binding agreement called the Copenhagen
Accord.42 This led to a December 2011 agreement by a conference of 194
countries to negotiate a new accord for binding emissions targets that
would include the developing world, which is where most of the new
sources of emissions are located.43 As these efforts have shown, building
global consensus takes time, but is achievable.
2.

Balancing Environmentalism with Other Factors is Central to U.S.
Energy Policy

U.S. policymakers have carefully balanced the above changes in
GHG-related public policies against other aspects of U.S. energy policy,
most notably the need to reduce dependence on foreign energy sources.44
These issues have played out most dramatically with petroleum-based
products, such as oil and gasoline, that are largely used in the
transportation sector and for heating homes.45 When demand for oil
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
See Bush: Kyoto Treaty Would Have Hurt Economy, MSNBC.COM (June 30, 2005, 4:50 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8422343/ns/politics/t/bush-kyoto-treaty-would-havehurt-economy/.
42
See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–19, 2009,
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, 4–9, U.N. DOC.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/
cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4; see also William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the
Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 457, 457 (2010) (“The 2009 United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen has
been widely viewed as a failure.”).
43
See Arthur Max, Climate Conference President Says Agreement Reached on Course for
Future Global Warming Talks, CANADIAN BUS. (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.canadian
business.com/article/61395--climate-conference-president-says-agreement-reached-oncourse-for-future-global-warming-talks.
44
See JAY HAKES, A DECLARATION OF ENERGY INDEPENDENCE 15–20 (2008) (discussing
the rapid growth in energy demand and policies employed by the United States to meet
demand).
45
The transportation sector comprises approximately twenty-eight percent of the enduse energy in the United States, of which about ninety-five percent comes from petroleum
40
41
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grew after World War II, the United States became a net importer of oil
for the first time.46 By the late 1950s, the country could no longer
produce enough energy to meet its consumption.47 Now, the United
States consumes about twenty million barrels of oil per day, though it
domestically produces less than half of that amount.48 The remainder is
imported from Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria,
among other countries.49 These dynamics have placed considerable
pressure on the United States to ally with countries hostile to American
interests and have influenced U.S. military actions.50
U.S. policymakers have appreciated that energy shortages, whether
caused by foreign influence or other factors, can have severe economic
consequences for Americans of average means. In 2008, for example,
when oil prices skyrocketed to over $145 a barrel,51 causing gasoline
prices to similarly soar to record highs,52 the U.S. economy plunged
further into a recession.53 For some hourly workers, the increased cost of

products. See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, supra note 18. For a discussion of
petroleum-based product usage in heating homes, see What is Energy?, supra note 37.
46
See HAKES, supra note 44, at 13; see also VITO A. STAGLIANO, A POLICY OF DISCONTENT:
THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 2–69 (2001) (describing the rise of natural
resources planning during the presidencies of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry
Truman).
47
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0384, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2010, at xix
(2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.
48
In 2010, the United States produced around 7.5 million barrels of oil per day and
consumed approximately 19.15 million barrels per day. See Oil: Crude and Petroleum
Products Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
index.cfm?page=oil_home (click “Data & Statistics” tab) (last updated July 5, 2011). In
comparison, the United States, in 2001, domestically produced around eight million barrels
daily and consumed approximately 19.65 million barrels per day; consumption exceeded
twenty million barrels per day throughout most of the previous decade. See Luis E.
Cuervo, OPEC From Myth to Reality, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 433, 446–47 (2008); Alex Kowalski,
Trade Deficit of U.S. Unexpectedly Surges on Increase in Crude-Oil Imports, BLOOMBERG (July
12, 2011, 3:07 P.M), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-12/trade-deficit-of-u-sunexpectedly-surges-on-increase-in-crude-oil-imports.html; Historical Data Graphs per Year,
INDEXMUNDI.COM, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=88&v=91&v=93&c=us&l=
en (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
49
See Robert Rapier, Top 10 Sources for U.S. Oil in 2009, CONSUMER ENERGY REP. (Feb. 3,
2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2010/01/25/top-10-sources-foru-s-oil-for-2009/.
50
See, e.g., Arthur Rizer, The National Security Threat of Energy Dependence: A Call for A
Nuclear Renaissance, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 193, 199–200 (2011) (tracing the relationship
between United States’ oil interests and war).
51
See Rebekah Kebede, Oil Hits Record Over $145, REUTERS (July 3, 2008, 8:28 PM),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/07/03/us-markets-oil-idUKT14048520080703.
52
See id.
53
See James C. Cooper, When Oil Prices Double, Recession Often Follows, FISCAL TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/04/25/When-Oil-Prices-
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getting back and forth from a job made keeping those jobs infeasible
after taxes, day care, and other such working-related expenses were
calculated. Other impacts rippled throughout the U.S. economy, such as
higher prices on food and other staples, which were felt broadly by
many Americans.54
This relationship between affordable energy and the ability of
Americans to meet their most basic needs has forced Congress to
prioritize the goal of energy independence. While challenges on this
front continue with petroleum-based products, there has been much
success with the major sources of energy for electricity, including coal,
natural gas, and nuclear power. In 1946, Congress enacted the Atomic
Energy Act to spur development of nuclear energy for base-load
electricity and establish a regulatory body, the Atomic Energy
Commission.55 In 1974, in response to the first oil crisis of the 1970s,
Congress enacted legislation prohibiting power plants from relying on
petroleum or natural gas as their primary source of power.56 In 1978,
Congress restricted construction of new power plants using oil or natural
gas as a base load fuel, encouraging reliance on coal and nuclear
energy.57 Congress also enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act in 1978,58 which marked an initial departure from the electricity
regulatory model established by the Federal Power Act of 1920 and
subsequent amendments in the 1930s,59 and opened the path to greater
competition in electric energy markets.60 More recently, Congress

Double-Recession-Often-Follows.aspx#page1 (discussing the relationship between rising
oil prices and economic decline).
54
See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF HIGH OIL PRICES ON THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 2 (2004), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/npsum/high_
oil04sum.pdf; see also Rizer, supra note 50, at 241 (describing the impact oil imports have on
the U.S. balance of trade); Ambuj D. Sagar, Hongyan H. Oliver & Ananth P. Chikkatur,
Climate Change, Energy, and Developing Countries, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 4 (2006) (discussing
disproportionate impacts of energy supply shortages on developing countries).
55
42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006). The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the Atomic
Energy Commission and re-assigned its functions to two new agencies, the Energy
Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5891 (2006)).
56
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 2,
88 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 (2006)).
57
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8484 (2006)).
58
See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 15, 16, 42, and 43 U.S.C.).
59
16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006).
60
See Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, and Regulation: A Look
Back, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 33, 34–35 (2010).
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enacted the Energy Policy Act in 1992,61 which gave rise to independent
power producers,62 the Energy Policy Act of 2005,63 and the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007.64
The initiatives advancing domestic production of fossil fuels all
occurred at the same time Congress and the EPA were responding to
concerns raised by environmental groups about global climate change.65
U.S. energy policy has emphasized measured, balanced, and incremental
solutions.
3.

Climate Change Litigation is a Result of Frustration with this
Balanced Approach

In the early 2000s, some environmentalists became frustrated with
the need for this balanced, incremental approach.66 They lamented that,
as demonstrated by the recent failure of Congress to pass cap and trade
legislation, the political will has never developed in the United States for
environmental concerns over fossil fuel emissions to outweigh the other
factors, such that the country would unilaterally limit GHG emissions.67

61
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 16, 25, 26, 30, and 42 U.S.C.).
62
See Dennis, supra note 60, at 35.
63
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
64
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 15, 40, 42, and 46 U.S.C.); see also Alison C.
Graab, Note, The Smart Grid: A Smart Solution to a Complicated Problem, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2051, 2067–71 (2011) (discussing key provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007).
65
Even as U.S. policymakers were taking active steps with regards to global climate
change allegations, “energy planners have [consistently] turned [back] to coal as an
intermediate term (fifty to 100 years) or long-term (more than 100 years) energy source.”
A. Dan Tarlock, Western Coal in Context, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 315, 318 (1982).
66
See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the
Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 246–53 (2011); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Electric
Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 821, 837–79
(2010); Dennis, supra note 60, at 34–35; see also Darren M. Springer, States Lead by Example on
Energy Policy, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 29 (2008) (discussing state efforts to reduce GHG
emissions).
67
See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE COSTS OF REDUCING GREENHOUSE-GAS
EMISSIONS (2009) [hereinafter CBO, COSTS OF REDUCING GHGS] (analyzing the costs of
various congressional proposals to reduce GHGs); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS (2009) [hereinafter CBO,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION] (analyzing the economic impact of congressional
proposals to reduce GHGs). According to the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), the
proposed cap-and-trade provision in H.R. 2454 would reduce the United States’ gross
domestic product (“GDP”) and would lead to slightly higher unemployment. CBO, COSTS
OF REDUCING GHGs, supra, at 2. Additionally, the CBO estimates that the American Clean
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The advocates filed several legal actions, including American Electric
Power Co., to force GHG limits through litigation.
With surprising candor, the lawyers acknowledged that the private
tort suits, which were part of the overall litigation approach, were
designed to force Congress and regulators to limit GHGs, not to actually
subject the named companies to liability.68 For example, Connecticut
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, the lead attorney general in
American Electric Power Co., said the suit was based on his “gut feeling
[and] emotion, that CO2 pollution and global warming were problems
that needed to be addressed,” and they were “brainstorming about what
could be done” because action “wasn’t coming from the federal
government.”69 Echoed Maine Attorney General Stephen Rowe: “[I]t’s a
shame that we’re here, here we are trying to sue polluters who are
polluting because the federal government is being inactive.”70 Even
Second Circuit Judge Peter Hall, who authored the Second Circuit
opinion in American Electric Power Co. allowing the case to continue, has
since conceded that “[y]ou really don’t want a district judge supervising
your relief in all of this stuff,” but “[t]o the extent there is out
there . . . some opportunity to pursue or continue to pursue a nuisance
action, that may help in a political sense.”71
B. Global Warming Allegations in the Courtroom
1.

Massachusetts v. EPA

The first significant GHG emissions-related lawsuit was
Massachusetts v. EPA, which sought to directly force the political
Energy and Security Act of 2009 would lead to a reduction in GDP between 2015 and 2050.
CBO, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION, supra, at 11.
68
See, e.g., Robert Meltz, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32764, Climate Change Litigation: A
Growing Phenomenon 1 (2008) (“Many proponents of litigation or unilateral state action
freely concede that such initiatives are make-do efforts that, while making a small
contribution to mitigating climate change, are also aimed at prodding the national
government to act.”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina,
and 9/11: Exploring Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2009)
(“Climate change litigation of various kinds is clearly on the rise, and the trend is to hold
that potential damage from climate change is a legally cognizable injury.”).
69
Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy, 30
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335, 339 (2005) [hereinafter Role of State Attorneys General]. Attorney
General Blumenthal led the first joint climate-change action. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
70
Role of State Attorneys General, supra note 69, at 342–43.
71
Key Judge Downplays Prospects for Successful Climate Change Suits, CLEAN ENERGY REP.
(Mar. 2, 2010), http://cleanenergyreport.com/20100302102610/Carbon-Control-DailyNews/News/key-judge-downplays-prospects-for-successful-climate-damagessuits/menu-id-202.html (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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branches of government—namely the EPA—to regulate GHG
emissions.72 In this case, more than twenty parties—including twelve
states, four territorial and local governments, and numerous trade
associations73—petitioned for a review of the EPA’s 2003 denial of a
rulemaking request to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles.74
The EPA denied the request on the grounds that the agency did not have
the authority to regulate the emissions,75 and alternatively asserted that
even if it did have the authority, the piecemeal approach of regulating
emissions solely for vehicles would conflict with the President’s
comprehensive approach to climate change.76
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, because GHGs fit within
Congress’s definition of pollutants, EPA has statutory authority to
regulate the GHG emissions under the CAA.77 As a result, the Supreme
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
Id. Petitioners included California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Id. at
505 n.2. New York City, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C., the territory of American
Samoa, and many private organizations, including the Center for Biological Diversity,
Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates,
Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for
Technology Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research
Group also joined in the action. Id. at 505 n.3–4.
74
See id. at 505 (stating that the questions before the Court included “whether EPA has
the statutory authority to regulate [GHG] emissions from new motor vehicles; and if so,
whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so are consistent with the statute”); see also 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (empowering the EPA Administrator to promulgate regulations
governing air pollution from automobiles). Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA provides the EPA
Administrator with authority to:
[P]rescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the
provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.
Id.
75
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528; see also Control of Emissions From New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003) (noting that previous EPA
General Counsels addressed the issue of EPA’s authority to set control requirements for
CO2 emissions). They found that the CAA definition of “air pollutant” included CO2 and
therefore could be subject to regulation under the CAA if the applicable statutory criteria
was met; both previous General Counsels also noted that the Agency had not made the
requisite findings for such CO2 emissions regulation. Id.
76
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528.
77
See id. at 528 (noting that the EPA’s argument that it lacked the authority under the
CAA to regulate new vehicle emissions because carbon dioxide is not considered an air
pollutant as defined in the Act was incorrect); see also Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549
U.S. 561, 570–71 (2007) (concerning whether an energy company violated the CWA when it
72
73
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Court set forth a means for EPA, should it decide to do so, to regulate
GHG emissions pursuant to the Agency’s congressional authority. Thus,
Massachusetts v. EPA settled an issue of administrative law. The issue was
solely whether the EPA’s denial of a petition for a regulatory rulemaking
was “arbitrary, capricious . . . or otherwise not in accordance with
[statutory] law.”78 Such a review of administrative procedure and
statutory interpretation is firmly within the province of the judiciary.79
As it has made clear since, the Supreme Court was neither creating an
avenue for courts to limit emissions nor subjecting private-sector
interests to liability for contributing to global GHG emissions.80
2.

Federal District Court Cases Against Private Entities

Soon after Massachusetts v. EPA was filed, four major global climate
change tort lawsuits were launched against private-sector entities,
namely the nation’s largest utility, energy, and automobile companies.81
These suits generally claim that the companies engaged in operations or
made products that contributed to the build-up of GHGs in the
atmosphere, causing the earth to warm, thereby creating a “public
nuisance.”82 As discussed in Part I of this Article, the first of these cases,
modified its coal power plants without first obtaining a permit); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v.
Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959–60 (D. Or. 2006) (alleging a violation of the
CAA for constructing a GHG-producing facility without a permit); James L. Arnone et al.,
Global Climate Change Litigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: LAW AND STRATEGY 11–12
(Cary R. Perlman ed., 2009) (stating that the CAA empowers the EPA to set National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) to protect public health and the environment).
Notably, only two published cases involve actions against the energy industry under the
CAA, the most logical statute under which to bring claims related to GHG emissions. “The
dearth of cases discussing [CAA] violations related to global climate change reflects the fact
that the fight still centers on federal and state GHG regulation, not enforcement.” Id. at 12.
78
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
79
See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8) (2006).
80
See Arnone et al., supra note 77, at 8 (“Although the case is remarkable in itself, it was
only the beginning of the wave of climate change litigation that the [United States] is now
experiencing.” (footnote omitted)).
81
See generally Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(bringing suit against American Electric Power, a utility company), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (bringing suit against utility, energy, and oil companies);
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007) (bringing suit against multiple automobile manufacturers); Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (bringing suit
against various oil and energy companies), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), appeal
dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
82
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (noting that allegations for common law public nuisance were attributed to
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Connecticut v. American Electric Power, Co.,83 was brought by several state
attorneys general,84 who sued to enjoin the defendant energy
companies85 to reduce their emissions of GHGs by specific percentages
for a minimum of ten years.86 In California v. General Motors Corp.,87 the
California attorney general sought to subject car manufacturers to
liability for making cars that emit GHGs through vehicle exhaust.88
Finally, two cases, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. and Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,89 were filed by private individuals seeking
to recover damages caused by weather-related events, including
Hurricane Katrina, they alleged were caused or made more intense by
global climate change.90
Federal district court judges in each case dismissed the claims as
non-justiciable.91 They concluded that deciding which GHG emitters in

global warming which will allegedly cause irreparable harm to citizens and the
environment).
83
Id.
84
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267. Respondents included Connecticut, New
York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the City of
New York. Id. This lawsuit was opposed by state attorneys general from more than
twenty other states. See Brief of the States of Indiana, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wyoming, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Connecticut (Feb. 7, 2011) (No. 10-174).
85
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267. Petitioners named American Electric
Power Co., American Electric Power Service Corporation (together, “AEP”), the Southern
Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy, Inc., and Cinergy Corporation as
defendants.
86
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (noting that the plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief requiring the defendants to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions for “at least a
decade” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87
No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
88
See id. at *1 (alleging that the six defendants produce vehicles that emit over 289
million metric tons of carbon dioxide, which represents over twenty percent of the humangenerated carbon dioxide emissions in the United States).
89
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D.
Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th
Cir. 2010); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
90
See Comer, 585 F.3d at 859 (alleging that defendants’ emissions of GHGs resulted in
global warming, which increased sea levels and therefore added to the catastrophe of
Hurricane Katrina); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (alleging that global warming caused
by defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions caused harsher winter storms, which resulted in
erosion of the Kivalina coast).
91
See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
bring claims and the questions presented were barred by the political question doctrine);
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal.
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the United States should be subject to liability for global changes in
weather patterns was an inherently political—not judicial—function.92
As the American Electric Power, Co. trial court stated, “[t]he scope and
magnitude of the relief [p]laintiffs seek reveals the transcendently
legislative nature of this litigation.”93 To adjudicate the claims, the trial
courts concluded they would have to cap defendants’ emissions “by
judicial fiat.”94 This would require courts to determine appropriate
levels of GHG emissions; whether liability should rest with only a small
segment of the industry; and the economic and national security
implications of curtailing these emissions.95 The American Electric Power,
Co. trial court also stated that, “[b]ecause resolution of the issues
presented here requires identification and balancing of economic,
environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests, ‘an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion’ is
Such weighing of interests, the court reasoned, is
required.”96
“consigned to the political branches, not the [j]udiciary.”97 Otherwise,
the courts would be “exposing automakers, utility companies, and other
industries to damages flowing from a new judicially-created tort for
doing nothing more than lawfully engaging in their respective spheres of
commerce within those [s]tates.”98
Even though Comer and Kivalina were brought by private plaintiffs,
not state attorneys general, the trial judges viewed the lawsuits in the
same light as the other cases. Judge Dennis, in Comer, said the claims
were embodiments of the ongoing “debate” over global climate change
policy that “simply has no place in the court” until Congress sets
standards that judges and juries can apply to decide cases: “These policy
decisions are best left to the executive and legislative branches of the
government, who are not only in the best position to make those
decisions but are constitutionally empowered to do so.”99 The Kivalina
trial judge decried that the lack of judicially discoverable and
Sept. 17, 2007); Comer, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
92
See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871; Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *6–8; Am. Elec.
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272, (noting that decisions of this nature are best left to the
legislative and executive branches and are not to be resolved by the judiciary); see also
Comer, 585 F.3d at 860 n.2 (summarizing trial judge’s ruling from the bench).
93
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
94
Id. at 274.
95
Id. at 272.
96
Id. at 274 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
97
Id.
98
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (citation omitted).
99
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (2009).
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manageable standards prohibited courts from “render[ing] a decision
that is principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”100
These courts also explained that the “global” scope of these cases
made climate change claims completely different from traditional public
nuisance cases in which plaintiffs have successfully established liability
for discrete, identifiable sources of pollution.101 As the trial judge in
General Motors stated, “there are multiple worldwide sources of
atmospheric warming across myriad industries and multiple
countries.”102 Further, the Kivalina judge wrote, “there is no realistic
possibility of tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to
any particular emissions by any specific person, entity, group [sic] at any
particular point in time,” or at any particular place.103
As a result, there are endless combinations and permutations of
plaintiffs and defendants with no “manageable method of discerning the
entities that are creating and contributing to the alleged nuisance.”104
This allows the plaintiffs to be in the position of picking winners and
losers in the global climate change debate, as the litigation demonstrates
their “political judgment that the two dozen [d]efendants . . . should be
the only ones to bear the cost of contributing to global warming.” 105 This
situation, Comer continued, created “daunting evidentiary problems” for
showing that any individual defendant’s GHG emissions “affected the
weather system.”106 In short, the significant trial management challenges
these cases presented were judicially insurmountable and, as the trial
judges ruled, raised constitutional concerns implicating the political
question doctrine.107
Despite the trial courts’ consensus, a panel of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in American Electric Power, Co. and, initially, a panel of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Comer disagreed. Both courts,

100
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(citing Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005)).
101
Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *15.
102
Id.
103
Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880.
104
Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *15.
105
Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
106
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *4
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007).
107
See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883, 880 (stating that the plaintiffs claim was barred,
and granting defendants’ motion to dismiss); Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *15
(noting that the court was left without a manageable method of discerning the creators of
the alleged nuisance); Comer, 2006 WL 1066645, at *3 (noting that the broad classes of
parties is not practical for this type of civil suit); Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265,
267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that the questions presented are not ones for the judiciary to
answer).
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within weeks of each other, overturned the lower court dismissals and
allowed the cases to proceed, though the Fifth Circuit later vacated that
ruling.108 The Second Circuit ruling, in particular, provided a major
appellate victory for regulating GHG emissions through the judiciary.109
It set forth a robust view of common law torts to gap fill federal
legislation, stating that until federal laws and regulations address global
climate change, “federal courts will be empowered to appraise the
equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by [GHGs].”110
Meanwhile, California’s attorney general voluntarily withdrew the claim
in General Motors,111 and Kivalina is still pending in the Ninth Circuit.112
3.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Second Circuit case,
marking the first time the High Court had agreed to hear a tort-based
dispute alleging direct harm from global climate change. The Court
unanimously reversed the Second Circuit’s holding that had allowed the
case to proceed on federal common law public nuisance grounds.
In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that
because Congress, through the CAA, “delegated to EPA the decision
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions” of the
defendants, it acted to “displace[] [any] federal common law” right of
The Court made clear that
action that might have existed.113
108
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that
the district court erred in dismissing the complaints on political question grounds and that
plaintiffs had standing to bring the claims); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860
(5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that plaintiffs had standing to assert claims and that those
claims did not present nonjusticiable political questions); see also Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA (Comer II), 607 F.3d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that after reinstating the case, the
Fifth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc; however, a number of the judges had to
recuse themselves, causing the court to lack a quorum to rehear the case).
109
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 321, 323 (“Simply because an issue may have political
implications does not make it non-justiciable.”). The Comer plaintiffs re-filed this case and,
as this Article was being sent to print, the federal district court dismissed the case again.
See Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00220-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Mar. 20, 2012).
110
Id. at 392–93 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
111
Amanda Bronstad, California’s Global Warming Suit Melts Away, LAW.COM (June 26,
2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202431782836.
112
See Peter Glaser & Douglas A. Henderson, Supreme Court Observations: AEP v.
Connecticut, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (June 22, 2011), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2011/06/22/
supreme-court-observations-aep-v-connecticut/ (noting that the Kivalina case remains
pending in the Ninth Circuit).
113
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
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displacement of the federal common law claim occurred when Congress
enacted the CAA, which delegates authority to the EPA, and not from
any specific EPA action. Thus, this decision echoed and reinforced the
avenue for addressing emissions set forth in Massachusetts v. EPA.114 In
an ironic way, Massachusetts, which advocates of climate change
litigation had relied on to support the private tort suits, laid the predicate
for the Court’s assertion that a “parallel track” through the common law
did not exist to achieve the same end of regulating GHG emissions.115
III. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO.’S IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
The import of the Supreme Court ruling in American Electric Power
Co. is not limited to its displacement holding; the Court went to
significant lengths to express the practical reasons why empowering the
judiciary to regulate GHG emissions would be ill-advised regardless of
the cause of action.116 This theme was first discussed during oral
arguments, as Justice Ginsberg signaled that she was troubled that
climate change litigation would “set up a district judge . . . as a kind of
super EPA.”117
In the Court’s opinion, she explained that judges do not have the
basic tools the EPA has at its disposal to engage in the “complex
balancing” necessary for determining appropriate levels of GHG
emissions for American utilities and other GHG emitters.118 For
example, she stated that “judges lack the scientific, economic, and
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this
order.”119 “[J]udges are confined by a record comprising the evidence
the parties present.”120 Also, unlike Congress and EPA, “[j]udges may
not commission scientific studies or convene groups of experts for
advice, or issue rules under notice-and-comment procedures inviting
input by any interested person, or seek the counsel of regulators” that
See id. at 2532–33.
Id. at 2538. As the Court even stated, “[i]f EPA does not set emissions limits for a
particular pollutant or source of pollution, [s]tates and private parties may petition for a
rulemaking on the matter,” but they may not pursue private tort litigation under a theory
such as federal common law public nuisance. Id. (emphasis in original).
116
See id. at 2539 (noting that the prescribed order of decision-making under the Act is:
(1) the expert administrative agency; and (2) federal judges, which is a reason to resist
setting emissions standards by judicial decree).
117
Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct.
2527 (2011) (No. 10-174).
118
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539.
119
Id. at 2539–40.
120
Id.
114
115
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would facilitate an objective, comprehensive evaluation of GHG
emission limits.121 The Court continued that it was “fitting that Congress
designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as
primary regulator of [GHG] emissions,”122 and that setting GHG
emission limits “is undoubtedly an area ‘within national legislative
power.’”123
A. The Requirements of Common Law Liability Do Not Provide a Valid
Process for Fairly Determining Who, If Anyone, Should Have to Restrict
Their GHG Emissions
The Supreme Court’s concerns with global climate change tort
litigation appears to be that, regardless of the tort or court, it is
impossible to assign liability in a legally principled, judicious manner.
As suggested by the Court’s opinion, there are two hurdles common to
all tort theories that cannot be overcome: no defendant can be deemed
the “cause” of an injury allegedly stemming from global climate change
and judicially-available remedies will not cure, stop, or slow GHG
accumulation in the atmosphere. If a plaintiff cannot prove that the
defendant caused her harm or the court cannot order an appropriate
remedy, there is no liability and the courts cannot “regulate” the
defendant’s conduct.
1.

Climate Change Injuries, Even if They Exist, Are Not Caused By Any
Defendant

The first task for any government body in regulating conduct is to
determine which group of people or businesses must abide by its
rulings. As the Supreme Court noted, the EPA can decide whose GHGs
to regulate if it chooses to do so.124 By contrast, courts cannot choose
who to “regulate.” First, they can only apply the law to those named in
the litigation. As history has shown, plaintiffs’ lawyers would prioritize
companies perceived to have “deep pockets” and a major stake in the
litigation such that they might settle or pay an award. Other businesses
and individuals that emit GHGs would not be before the court.125 In
addition, all tort law, including public nuisance theory, can only subject
an entity to liability, if the entity is a legal cause of the alleged injury;
Id. at 2540.
See id. (“The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than individual
district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.”).
123
Id. at 2535 (emphasis added) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964)).
124
See id. at 2537–39.
125
See supra Part II.B (discussing climate change tort litigation).
121
122
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there must be “some reasonable connection between the act or omission
of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.”126
It has become clear through the cases to date that actual causation
cannot be established in global climate change cases without grossly
distorting the meaning of these requirements.127 The release of carbon
dioxide or other GHGs is not particular to any individual company or
industry; numerous human activities and natural occurrences release
these gases into the atmosphere. For example, GHGs are released
through fossil fuel combustion at factories, power plants, and other
manufacturing facilities as well as through exhaust from airplanes, ships,
cars, trucks, and many other types of vehicles.128 These sources are also
stationed throughout the world, with an estimated eighty-three percent
of GHG emissions occurring outside of the United States.129
Further, there are numerous natural sources of GHGs, including
volcanic eruptions, ocean-atmosphere exchange (where the ocean
absorbs and releases carbon dioxide), and, of course, the respiration
processes of living, aerobic organisms (i.e., breathing).130 These GHGs
are then mixed with all other GHGs that have been emitted over the past
150 years in the atmosphere, where GHGs from any one source cannot
be distinguished from any other.131 The allegations in these cases are

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
127
In tort litigation, a plaintiff alleging a climate change injury must be able to show that
a defendant’s emissions are the actual cause of global climate change and, in turn, the
specific injury alleged. Also, the defendant’s conduct must have been the proximate cause
of the alleged injury, i.e., the specific injury to the plaintiff must have been reasonably
foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s conduct. See Schwartz, et al., supra note 11, at 834;
see FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2 (1986) (“Through all the diverse
theories of proximate cause runs a common thread; almost all agree that defendant’s
wrongful conduct must be a cause in fact of plaintiff’s injury before there is liability.”).
128
See
Human-Related
Sources
and
Sinks
of
Carbon
Dioxide,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/co2_human.html (last updated Apr. 14,
2001) (listing a variety of human activities that lead to carbon dioxide emissions).
129
See Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, annex A, Dec.
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (noting that under the Kyoto Protocol, the following six gases
have been categorized as GHGs: (1) carbon dioxide; (2) methane; (3) nitrous oxide; (4)
hydrofluorocarbons; (5) perfluorocarbons; (6) and sulphur hexafluoride); see also Jane A.
Leggett et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL 34659, China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Mitigation Policies 7 (2008) (stating that carbon dioxide is absorbed by naturally occurring
activities such as forest management and land use).
130
See Natural Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/co2_natural.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2011) (noting the
primary natural processes that release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere).
131
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 345 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that
plaintiffs could not allege particular harms that would be caused directly by defendants’
actions, nor could they allege that the emissions alone would cause future harm).
126
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that this 150-year accumulation and mix of GHGs has materially
increased the earth’s air and water temperatures, melting polar ice,
raising sea levels, and causing more frequent and intense weather
events. These events have, in turn, allegedly injured plaintiffs beyond
that which would have occurred if the GHGs had not collected in the
atmosphere.132
Therefore, even if the allegations are true—and the Supreme Court
“caution[ed]” that it “endorses no particular view of the complicated
issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate change”133—the
six utilities named in American Electric Power Co. did not cause the
alleged injuries. First, the Supreme Court made clear that the defendants
were not the actual, “but-for” cause of the states’ and land trusts’ specific
alleged injuries. The Court said that even the plaintiffs acknowledged
that “[s]imilar suits could be mounted . . . against ‘thousands or
hundreds or tens’ of other defendants fitting the description ‘large
contributors’ to carbon-dioxide emissions.”134 The same is true for the
defendants in Kivalina and Comer, as no one can say that any handful of
companies caused a hurricane to strengthen or ice barrier to melt.135
These companies also cannot be deemed the legal cause of the
injuries, which looks at “the significance of the defendant’s conduct
[and] the appropriate scope of liability,” as well as “heavy elements of
moral and policy judgment.”136 The above Rube Goldberg-esque
132
See supra note 89 and accompanying text (noting plaintiffs’ claims that GHG emissions
led to weather related tragedies); see also Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 314 (discussing
how plaintiffs’ generally assert that these climate changes are adverse and seek damages
without attempting to tie the alleged effect to any specific event or set of injuries).
133
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533 n.2. As this statement suggests, the law and
policy arguments, both in American Electric Power, Co. and this Article, are independent of
the scientific veracity of the factual allegations.
134
Id. at 2540.
135
It is said that:
An intervening force is one which joins with the defendant’s conduct
to cause the injury. Such a force, whether it be human, animal,
mechanical, or natural is considered intervening because it occurs after
the defendant’s conduct. An intervening force will only act to cut off
proximate cause if it is characterized as superseding . . . . [W]hile
courts are quick to find negligence of a third party foreseeable and
hence not superseding, criminal acts are often characterized as
extraordinarily unforeseeable and hence superseding.
JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 256 (1st ed. 2001). Generally, a party is
not liable unless it “increase[s] an unreasonable risk of harm through its intervention.”
KEETON ET AL., supra note 126, at 305.
136
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 167, at 408 (2000). For example:
[S]uppose that a surgeon negligently performs a vasectomy. Because
the surgery was negligently performed, the patient fathers a child. The
child, at the age of [thirteen], sets fire to the plaintiff’s barn. Is the
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causation allegations demonstrate the remoteness of the conduct to the
harm alleged. Specific injuries from Hurricane Katrina, for example, are
not among the harms any reasonable person who emits GHGs would
have foreseen as a result of its activities.
Without the causation filter, no defendant could avoid future
liability unless they stop all GHG emissions, which cannot occur so long
as fossil fuels continue to be a staple of American energy consumption.
Allowing such cases to proceed would mean that any time someone
sustains an injury allegedly caused by global climate change, including
droughts, severe weather, hurricanes, and warmer temperatures, the
same defendants could be subject to liability over and over again.137 As a
result, and in addition to these practical concerns, the inability to
establish causation in these cases raises constitutional issues because
defendants would be denied their due process safeguard of notice that it
was potentially engaged in liability-inducing activities.
2.

There is No Remedy the Courts Could Order that Would Address
the Alleged Injuries

There also is no remedy the courts could order that would address
the alleged injuries. Even if plaintiffs won American Electric Power Co.
and the six utilities named had “to cap [their] carbon dioxide emissions
and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a
decade,”138 the plaintiffs’ alleged harms would not be redressed. The
reduction—or even the elimination—of GHG emissions by any
defendant, even under plaintiffs’ allegations, would have no effect on
stopping or slowing climate change. The multitude of other sources
throughout the world would render such a remedy hollow. Therefore,
isolating the defendants in American Electric Power Co. could not, as
plaintiffs’ suggest, lead to “[t]he appropriate amount of regulation in any
particular greenhouse gas-producing sector.”139
Further, given the lack of any overarching standards, different
jurisdictions would undoubtedly develop different emission limits.
What one judge decides is a reasonable limit for the defendant, another

surgeon liable for the loss of the barn? He was negligent in performing
the vasectomy, and his negligence is a cause in fact of the fire and the
loss of the barn. . . . Courts are likely in such a case to say that the
surgeon’s negligence is not a proximate cause of the harm done.
Id. § 180, at 444.
137
See Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (holding
that risk contribution violates due process).
138
131 S. Ct. at 2534 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139
Id. at 2539.
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judge may decide is unreasonable. Also, an emissions limit for one
company or industry may not be reasonable for another. This “lack [of]
authority to render precedential decisions binding other judges, even
members of the same court,” was a significant concern of the Supreme
Court.140 The resulting liability system would create legal chaos.141
Any regulation of GHGs, therefore, cannot be aimed at remedying a
specific injury, but to address, to the extent needed, broad-based
environmental allegations of climate change. As the Supreme Court
wisely observed, given modern society’s pervasive reliance on fossil
fuels, not even Congress could “preemptively prohibit every discharge
of carbon dioxide unless covered by a permit.”142 Rather, for each
industry and operator, “standard[s] of performance” would have to be
set based on long-term goals.143 As the Supreme Court explained,
agencies under congressional authorization are uniquely competent to
Consider the balancing EPA undergoes in
perform this task.144
implementing the CAA. It “must ‘tak[e] into account the cost of
achieving [emissions] reduction and any nonair quality health and
environmental impact and energy requirements.”145 It “may ‘distinguish
among classes, types, and sizes’ of stationary sources in apportioning
It also “may waive
responsibility for emissions reductions.”146
compliance with emission limits to permit a facility to test drive an
‘innovative technological system’ that has ‘not [yet] been adequately
demonstrated.’”147
For these reasons, which are common to all tort theories, it would be
arbitrary and unfair for any individual or group to be blamed for causing
or be solely accountable for remedying a specific climate change injury.
By going beyond its holding in American Electric Power Co. that the CAA
displaced federal common law and laying the foundation for the above
points, the Supreme Court provided a roadmap for how this decision
should be followed in future climate change tort cases.

Id. at 2540.
See supra Part II.B.2 (noting that the courts lack judicially manageable standards in
such cases).
142
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
146
Id. (citations omitted).
147
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(1)(A)).
140
141
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B. American Electric Power Co.’s Impact on Climate Change Going
Forward
Advocates of global climate change tort suits have downplayed the
Supreme Court’s policy statements in American Electric Power Co., both in
the media and in a briefing to the Ninth Circuit as to how American
Electric Power Co. should be applied in Kivalina.148 In an effort to narrow
the ruling, they have focused on the following three issues that may
determine how lower courts will apply American Electric Power Co. to the
cases before them. As this section of the Article discusses, the Court’s
roadmap should be followed, regardless of whether the controlling law,
parties involved, or remedies sought are identical to American Electric
Power Co.
1.

State vs. Federal Claims

The first argument for climate change litigation proponents is that
state common law claims remain fully viable for regulating GHG
emissions. The argument is based on the fact that American Electric Power
Co. held that Congress displaced only federal common law claims and
the legal analysis for why the federal claims were displaced does not
apply to state claims.
While the premise for this argument is true, the conclusion is
inconsistent with American Electric Power Co. First, the Court did not bar
state common law climate change actions because those claims were not
before the Court. The Court noted at the end of its opinion that
“plaintiffs also sought relief under state law, in particular, the law of
each [s]tate where the defendants operate power plants. The Second
Circuit did not reach the state law claims because it held that federal
common law governed.”149 Because the parties had not “addressed the
availability of a claim under state nuisance law,” the Court left “the
matter open for consideration on remand.”150 The Supreme Court’s lack
of opportunity to squarely address state claims is far different from
endorsing them.
Second, from a legal perspective, Congress cannot “displace” state
claims.151 To determine whether state claims remain viable, the Court
would have to determine whether Congress, in enacting the CAA,

148
See Brief for Appellant, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d
863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010).
149
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (citations omitted).
150
Id.
151
Id.
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expressly or impliedly preempted state actions.152 Preemption analyses
are based on congressional intent rather than simply whether Congress
entered the relevant field, which is the test the Court applied in holding
that Congress displaced federal actions.153 The fact that the Court did
not undertake a preemption analysis in American Electric Power Co. has
been played up by climate change tort litigation advocates in hopes of
finding a federal or state court judge that will allow a state-based claim
to proceed beyond a motion to dismiss.
The legal distinctions between federal and state actions, as well as
displacement and preemption, though, do not overcome the Court’s
statements of policy that the judiciary is simply not the appropriate
branch for making determinations on whether and how to cap GHG
emissions.154 The Court stated that there ought not be a “parallel track”
of tort litigation, and EPA regulation does not distinguish parallel tracks
of federal tort litigation from state tort litigation.155 The policy rationale
is the same. In oral argument, Justice Kennedy identified this point and
the legal awkwardness of only having a federal cause of action before
them. In anticipation that some might bring such a state claim, he
observed that “[i]t would be very odd”—in the illogical sense—for state
courts to set national caps on GHG emission when federal courts are
barred from doing so.156 The Court also wrote in its opinion that because
of the national scope of this issue, “here, borrowing the law of a
particular [s]tate would be inappropriate.”157 American Electric Power Co.
simply did not create an opportunity for state courts to take these cases
and endeavor to set national energy policy on emission caps.158
2.

Who Has Standing To Bring Which Claims?

The second battleground is whether the plaintiffs bringing the action
have constitutional standing to seek a remedy against the named
defendants. Constitutional standing is a case-by-case assessment,
determined anew for the parties, cause of action, and facts in each
individual case. A plaintiff’s “irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing” is to show an “injury in fact” that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to

152
See id. (“[T]he availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the
preemptive effect of the [CAA].”).
153
Id. at 2537.
154
See id. at 2539.
155
Id. at 2538.
156
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527
(2011) (No. 10-174).
157
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2536.
158
See id. at 2531.
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the challenged action of the defendant” and “likely . . . redress[able] by a
favorable decision.”159
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court determined that state
attorneys general had constitutional standing to file an administrative
law action against the EPA to require the EPA to make decisions
regarding GHG emission standards.160 In distinguishing attorneys
general from other types of plaintiffs, the Court wrote that “[i]t is of
considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign
[s]tate and not . . . a private individual.”161 The Court continued that
under the CAA, “Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts
(among others) by prescribing standards applicable to the emission of
[GHGs]” and “recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge
the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.”162
Accordingly, “[g]iven that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to
special solitude in our standing analysis.”163 The Court reasoned that the
remedy sought, namely broad EPA regulations of GHGs, would reduce
the risk that such harm would occur, thereby sufficiently redressing the
harm Massachusetts alleged.164
In American Electric Power Co., the Supreme Court was presented
with the issue of whether the attorneys general possessed constitutional
standing to bring a tort action against private entities to cap emissions.165
The issue was not discussed in any detail. The opinion simply states that
four of the justices believed the issue was settled in Massachusetts v. EPA,
and four justices would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article III
standing.166 Thus, “by an equally divided Court, [it affirmed] the Second
Climate change litigation
Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction.”167
proponents will likely extrapolate the granting of standing in
Massachusetts v. EPA and the affirmation of the Second Circuit’s granting
of standing in American Electric Power Co. to conclude that the standing
question has been answered: Standing exists for global climate change
cases generally, regardless of the plaintiffs bringing the cases or purpose
of the action.
159
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
160
549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007).
161
Id. at 518.
162
Id. at 519–20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163
Id. at 520.
164
See id.
165
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
166
Id. at 2534.
167
Id. at 2535.
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Any fair reading of Lujan, Massachusetts v. EPA, and American Electric
Power Co. suggests that such an argument should fail. A court must
engage in a fresh analysis of traceability and redressability in each case
for the specific plaintiffs, specific defendants, specific harms alleged, and
specific remedies sought. With respect to attorney general suits over
global climate change, just because the Court provided special standing
to states to seek federal administrative action in Massachusetts v. EPA, it
does not mean that they also have standing to bring tort suits or other
actions alleging global climate change harms against individual
defendants. The Second Circuit in American Electric Power Co. glossed
over this critical distinction in allowing state attorneys general standing
for a climate change tort case, conceding only that “[s]tate standing is not
monolithic and depends on the role a state takes when it litigates in a
particular case.”168 Unfortunately, the four justices that would have
extended standing to the attorneys general in the American Electric Power
Co. tort action provided no guidance for future courts as to how the
affirmation of the Second Circuit’s ruling should be applied to other
cases.
From a traceability and redressability standpoint, the two cases
present very different issues. As discussed above, the Court in
Massachusetts explained that when Congress has afforded a procedural
right to challenge an agency’s actions, litigants “can assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy” that satisfy standing.169 Thus, in Massachusetts, states
needed to show only that the EPA improperly discounted or ignored
evidence suggesting GHG emissions could generally lead to global
climate change, and that regulating them would generally reduce the risk
of the alleged climate change harms to the state.170 By contrast, a tort
action against a private entity requires a plaintiff to prove standing with
much greater specificity. It must show a specific injury directly traceable
to a particular defendant’s emissions and that the remedy sought against

168
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 335 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2000)). The court, having additionally
determined that the case did not present non-justiciable political questions that would act
to bar standing, went on to hold that the claimants satisfied the Supreme Court’s basic
standing requirements. Id. at 338. The Supreme Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, laid
out its basic standing analysis, which requires a claimant to show injury, causation, and
redressability. 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see supra Part II.B (discussing climate change tort
litigation).
169
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170
See id. at 499.
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that particular defendant would redress that specific injury.171 As
discussed in the previous section, this presents an insurmountable
hurdle.172 No such correlation can be made given the allegations that
climate change is the result of 150 years of global emissions from all over
the world comingling in the atmosphere.173
It is abundantly clear, though, that none of these rulings provide any
support for a finding that private plaintiffs have standing to bring global
climate change tort suits against individual defendants. Just the opposite
is true. In Massachusetts, the Court took pains to explain that its holding
was premised on the fact “that [s]tates are not normal litigants for the
purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.”174 Further, the four justices
that would have granted standing in American Electric Power Co. clarified
that Massachusetts v. EPA would only apply to “at least some plaintiffs,”
implying that the private plaintiffs and possibly the City of New York
would not have standing on their own.175 In Kivalina, therefore, the
private community in Alaska will have to show that the melting of the
sea ice barrier can be traced to the specific emissions of the defendants
and that the remedy sought will redress that injury. Also, the Comer
plaintiffs will have to prove that Hurricane Katrina can be traced to the
specific defendants’ emissions. Case law suggests that the Supreme
Court would not extend the standing granted to attorneys general in
Massachusetts v. EPA to those cases.
3.

Does it Matter if Plaintiffs Seek Injunctive Relief, Damages, or
Another Remedy?

Another way climate change litigation proponents have tried to limit
American Electric Power Co. is by arguing that the case only precludes
actions that seek to directly regulate emission levels, namely injunctive
relief and abatement, and not money damages. In Kivalina, this
argument has already surfaced, as plaintiffs have pointed to the Supreme
Court’s statement of holding “that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it
authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of
carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”176 They

171
See id. at 517 (“[A] litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to
the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.”).
172
See supra Part III.A (arguing that courts are not equipped to determine tort liability for
climate change cases).
173
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 336–38.
174
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518.
175
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
176
Id. at 2537 (emphasis added).
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argue that they are only seeking damages to be compensated for the
“severe” harm caused by global climate change, not to regulate or abate
emissions. Even if society determines that the current levels of emissions
are to continue, the argument is that those who are severely injured by
that conduct should still be able to seek monetary damages for those
severe injuries.177
While this argument may sound appealing, it is not consistent with
the law. The Supreme Court, as well as other courts, have consistently
held and repeatedly reaffirmed that tort damages “regulate” conduct in
the same way that state legislation and regulations do.178 In numerous
preemption rulings, the Supreme Court has made clear that state
“positive” law and tort law are equivalent because both impose legal
requirements.179 This is because a person subject to liability for certain
conduct will have to change that conduct to avoid future liability in the
same way it would change conduct to comply with statutes and
regulations. For example, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,180 the Court
held that common-law actions were preempted because a finding for
monetary liability would impose state law requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under the
applicable federal laws.181 In fact, the purpose of using tort litigation
damages to regulate GHG emissions is implicit in the title of the
Valparaiso University School of Law’s symposium—Civil Litigation as a
Tool for Regulating Climate Change—for which this Article was written.
Such tort claims, which do not go through legislative or regulatory
hearings, have the potential to have a far greater, unfair, and inconsistent

177
In Kivalina, for example, the plaintiffs wrongly argued to the Ninth Circuit that “[t]he
question of unreasonableness in a damages action is therefore not one of whether the
defendant’s conduct is reasonable or unreasonable but rather one of who should bear the
cost of that conduct.” Brief for Appellant at 25, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Mar. 10,
2010).
178
See infra Part IV.C (explaining why regulation through litigation is not feasible).
179
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (“[E]xcluding common-law
duties from the scope of pre-emption would make little sense.”).
180
544 U.S. 431 (2005).
181
See id. at 432–33 (holding that a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act preempted common-law actions because they imposed state law
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required
under federal law); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000); see also
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523–24 (1992) (holding that a provision of the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 preempted common law actions because they
would impose state law requirements or prohibitions based on smoking and health with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes whose packages were labeled in
accordance with federal law).
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regulatory effect than statutes or regulations.182 This was the exact
concern the Court expressed in opposing a separate track of civil liability
on GHG emissions.183
In addition, this argument has particular shortcomings within the
tort of public nuisance. This tort has specific rules as to when it can be
used and seeking monetary damages for severe harms from a public
nuisance is not one of them. Under centuries of jurisprudence, monetary
damages are only available when private plaintiffs are injured by a
public nuisance in a way that is “different [in kind] from that suffered by
other persons.”184 As the Restatement (Second) makes clear, “[i]t is not
enough that [one] has suffered the same kind of harm or interference but
to a greater extent or degree.”185
Assuming, for example, that the allegations of plaintiffs in Kivalina
and Comer are true, they are only suggesting that the public nuisance of
global climate change has impacted them in a “severe” way (i.e., to a far
greater degree than others). Indeed, they have fully acknowledged that,
even under their allegations, global climate change impacts weather
patterns for everyone. Simply claiming a “severe” climate change injury,
which is how they distinguish their claims from American Electric Power
Co., is not sufficient for recovering monetary damages under the tort of
public nuisance. As environmental attorneys have long-appreciated,
“the thoroughly entrenched ‘special injury rule’ and its constant
companion, the strict ‘different-in-kind’ test,” are gatekeepers that limit
the availability of public nuisance actions.186
Therefore, to state a claim for monetary damages from a public
nuisance, the plaintiffs must first demonstrate whether a public nuisance
exists and whether a particular defendant is responsible for it. This
requires proving the fundamental elements of the tort:
that
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (“[R]ules of law that judges and juries create or apply in such
suits may themselves similarly create uncertainty and even conflict, say, when different
juries in different [s]tates reach different decisions on similar facts.”).
183
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011); see Appellants’
Supplemental Brief on AEP v. Connecticut, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobile Corp.,
No. 09-17490 (filed Nov. 4, 2011). Professor Robert Reich, President Clinton’s Secretary of
Labor, is often credited with coining the phrase “regulation through litigation.” Robert B.
Reich, Don’t Democrats Believe in Democracy?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at A22. He has
stated that lawsuits under this notion are “faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy.”
Id.; see Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Addressing Regulation Through Litigation:
Some Solutions to Government Sponsored Lawsuits, 3 ENGAGE 109, 109 (2002); Victor E.
Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through Litigation Has
Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (2001).
184
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. b (1979).
185
Id.
186
Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury
Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 759 (2001).
182
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“unreasonable conduct by the tortfeasor . . . interfere[ed] with [a] public
right”; the tortfeasor had “control of the public nuisance”; and the public
nuisance was the factual and proximate cause of the alleged injuries.
Only then can the appropriate remedy be considered.187 Our earlier
writings provide a comprehensive discussion of the tort of public
nuisance and what must be shown to succeed in a public nuisance claim
generally and with respect to global climate change.188
The bottom line is that under legal doctrine and public policy, as
expressed in American Electric Power Co., lower courts should continue
rejecting global climate change tort cases.
IV. THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF PERMITTING THE JUDICIARY TO
REGULATE GHG EMISSIONS AND DETERMINE U.S. ENERGY POLICY
If lower courts ignore the Supreme Court’s message and endeavor to
set U.S. energy policy by focusing solely on allegations in litigation over
GHG emissions, the practical results would likely be a disjointed,
nonsensical U.S. energy policy. As this section of the Article discusses,
the supply of electricity and other energy sources would likely be
compromised, and the resulting increase of energy costs to American
consumers could push basic needs out of the reach of average
Americans. Further, this litigation would become a model for advocates
of other policies not adopted through the political process, causing
American courts to become a common destination for “regulating” all
sorts of products and conduct.
A. Picking Winners and Losers in Tort Litigation Would Disrupt Energy
Supply in Ways that Would Not Follow Any Rational, Overarching
Strategy for U.S. Energy Policy
A significant shortcoming of having courts set emission limits, as
discussed above, is that plaintiffs’ lawyers, in choosing whom to name as
defendants, and judges, in deciding where to set emission levels, would
get to pick the “winners” and “losers” in the global climate change
debate. The result would be a piecemeal approach to GHG emissions

Schwartz et al., supra note 11, at 818; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt.
c (1979) (“If the conduct of the defendant is not of a kind that subjects him to
liability . . . the nuisance exists, but he is not liable for it.”).
188
See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 552–61 (2006); Schwartz et al.,
supra note 11, at 834.
187
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that might not comport at all with a well-reasoned, appropriate national
energy policy.189
The American Electric Power Co. case against the American utility
companies demonstrates how this ad hoc approach might play out with
the ability of the utilities to meet the electricity generation needs of
American families and businesses. Currently, only three sources can
provide a steady, reliable output of energy for generating the “base”
amount of electricity the public needs throughout the day: coal, natural
gas, and nuclear power. Coal produces about forty-six percent of the
electricity production in the United States, followed by natural gas at
twenty-four percent and nuclear power at about twenty percent.190 If a
judicially-imposed cap on emissions made coal and natural gas less
affordable or available, utilities would have to immediately reduce fossil
fuel emissions and rely on energy sources that do not emit GHGs—
which is the very goal of those filing these suits. While these individuals
and groups may be frustrated with the incremental approach being
taken in Congress, it is clear that the blunt tool of imposing these results
through the courts is not a realistic option.
First, the technology for reducing fossil fuel emissions to be in
compliance with such a court ruling may not be available or
economically feasible, either immediately with respect to damage
awards or for meeting deadlines in an abatement order. This is not to
say that progress is not being made. Since the mid-1980s, the
government has invested $3 billion to develop and test clean coal
technologies.191 This approach has provided significant dividends, as
new coal-burning power plants emit ninety percent less pollutants than
plants they replace.192 As a result, while coal use has tripled since the
1970s, regulated emissions from coal-based electricity has decreased by
189
See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011) (noting that
Congress should make these determinations, not federal judges on an “ad hoc, case-bycase” basis). Courts could, for example, choose to prioritize how energy is produced in the
United States simply by adjusting arbitrary emission limits among coal-burning power
plants and facilities consuming natural gas. They could also impose emission limits that
grind either or both activities to a halt. The permutations are as endless as the
inconsistencies that would predictably develop. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining how courts could regulate “by judicial
fiat”); cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819) (“An unlimited power
to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy . . . .”).
190
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK 8 (2012), available at
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf.
191
See Cleaning Up Coal, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, http://www.fe.doe.gov/education/
energylessons/coal/index.html (last updated Oct. 9, 2008).
192
See Clean Coal Technology, NAT’L MINING ASS’N, http://www.nma.org/pdf/
fact_sheets/cct.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (citing findings of the National Energy
Technology Laboratory).
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nearly forty percent.193 President Obama has repeatedly asserted that his
energy policy includes continued investment in clean coal technology.194
This includes the development of “ultra-supercritical” units, which
operate at higher efficiency levels, and carbon capture and storage
techniques that minimize the release of carbon dioxide from coal
generation.195
Second, it is not realistic to think that other sources of energy,
including nuclear, wind, and solar, can materially replace coal and gas.
Nuclear power, the only other base-load source of electricity, is not
positioned to be the “winner” in the global climate change debate. Given
safety and waste-disposal concerns,196 America has not invested in new
generations of nuclear power plants, and the existing, aging plants are
already producing at full capacity. The remaining fuels, namely wind
and solar, are not “base-load” sources of electricity; they provide two
percent and one percent, respectively, of the United States’ power
generation.197 They can only supplement the grid during peak times and
facilitate discrete tasks,198 as both can only provide electricity

See id.
See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 27,
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-stateunion-address. President G. W. Bush also supported development of clean coal
technology. See, e.g., Robin Acton, Bush Urges Clean Coal Technology for Electricity, TRIB. LIVE
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_580555.
html.
195
See id.; see also Glaser, supra note 20, (manuscript at 35) (discussing “ultrasupercritical” combustion technology).
196
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-48, NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT:
KEY ATTRIBUTES, CHALLENGES, AND COSTS FOR THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY AND
TWO POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d1048.pdf; David Biello, Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Trash Heap Deadly for 250,000 Years or a
Renewable Energy Source?, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.
com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-waste-lethal-trash-or-renewable-energy-source&print=true.
197
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND ELECTRICITY
PRELIMINARY STATISTICS 2010, at 5 (2011) [hereinafter RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION
AND ELECTRICITY], available at http://www.eia.gov/renewable/annual/preliminary/
pdf/preliminary.pdf; see also Sarah Pizzo, Note, When Saving the Environment Hurts the
Environment: Balancing Solar Energy Development with Land and Wildlife Conservation in a
Warming Climate, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 123, 131 (2011) (noting that solar
energy accounts for a small percentage of U.S. energy demand).
198
As Julio Friedmann of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has explained, each
alternative energy form is severely “limited by cost, limited by scale, limited by physics
and chemistry, [or] limited by thermodynamics.” James Fallows, Dirty Coal, Clean Future,
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/12/
dirty-coal-clean-future/8307/. Friedmann also stated that, “[s]olar and wind power are
going to be important, but it is really hard to get them beyond [ten] percent of total power
supply.’” Id.
193
194
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intermittently and in select areas of the country.199 Wind and solar farms
also have met significant resistance. As the “Cape Wind” project in
Massachusetts has shown, wind farms are often opposed by local
communities voicing concerns about aesthetics, noise, safety, navigation,
property values, changes to the seascape, the impact on tourism, and
environmental issues, such as disturbances to marine animal and
migratory bird populations.200 Solar farms are opposed by land and
wildlife conservationists because they require five to ten acres of land
per megawatt of capacity.201
The practical shortcomings of imposing a judicial remedy here were
the same types of issues that weighed down the cap and trade legislation
that failed to pass Congress in 2009 and 2010. In the end, Congress and
regulators have seen the wisdom of addressing each energy challenge in
a nuanced way, shying away from any “one-size-fits-all” approach.202
Indeed, developing technologies to facilitate greater reliance on
alternative sources of energy has been a growing, stable part of
America’s energy policy through targeted subsidies and tax credits.203
This targeted, incremental approach will no doubt continue providing
results, just as it has over the past forty years in reducing coal-related
emissions and in raising gas mileage rates.204

199
California, Nevada, and Florida account for eighty-eight percent of solar power
generation, followed by Colorado, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, Arizona, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania. See RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND ELECTRICITY, supra note 197, at
11 (finding California, Nevada, and Florida each provide more than five times as much
solar energy generation as any other state). Solar power generation is negligible in most
other states. See id.
200
See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LARGE-SCALE OFFSHORE WIND POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES: ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS 8 (2010), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/wind/pdfs/40745.pdf; Dominic Spinelli, Note, Historic Preservation
& Offshore Wind Energy: Lessons Learned from the Cape Wind Saga, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 741, 748
(2010).
201
For example, the solar mirror field proposed for just outside the Mojave National
Preserve will consume some 3,400 acres (5.3 square miles). See Ivanpah Solar Electric
Generating System, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/
ivanpah/index.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2011).
202
See, e.g., California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (seeking money damages from defendant automobile companies
“for creating, contributing to, and maintaining a public nuisance”).
203
See Moses, supra note 37, at 41 (discussing alternative energy incentives in the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007); Graab, supra note 64, at 2070–71 (noting that
Congress has been aware of the need to decrease the United States’ dependence on oil and
has attempted to create incentives for producers of renewable energy sources).
204
See supra Part II.A (examining the development of GHG regulations as part of a
broader U.S. environmental policy).
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B. Courts, Unlike Regulations Through Congressional Authority, Cannot
Soften Any Unfair, Disproportionate Impact the Regulations Would Have
on American Consumers and Businesses
Through the nuanced approach discussed above, Congress can also
emphasize reforms that are mindful of the fact that costs associated with
implementing new regulations are borne directly by energy consumers,
businesses that rely on affordable energy to survive and compete, and
energy sector workers. As indicated, any isolated decision on GHG
emissions will undoubtedly increase the costs of generating electricity,205
curtail energy output,206 and cause energy producers to relocate
operations outside of the reach of the new “regulations.”207 Unlike
courts, Congress can find ways to reach these goals without infringing
on the primary benefits of inexpensive energy, which has been a driving
force in America’s economic success and led to a major increase in
people’s standard of living and life spans for more than a century and a
half.208
As advocates for the poor and elderly have expressed over the past
few years, limiting GHG emissions too much too quickly, whether
through litigation, legislation, or regulation, would disproportionately
impact their constituents.209 Already, American households earning
between $10,000 and $30,000 are estimated to allocate twenty-three
percent of their 2011 after-tax income to energy—a level more than twice
the national average and a sixty-five percent increase over the past ten
years.210 The Affordable Power Alliance,211 an umbrella organization of
several advocacy groups, issued a report in 2010 showing that potential
205
The degree of such cost increases would depend on how “reasonable” a particular
defendant’s emissions were, which, for reasons discussed throughout this section, would
be difficult to estimate.
206
See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RECENT INCREASES IN
ENERGY PRICES 1 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7420/07-21Energy%20DIST.pdf (discussing specific disruptions to the growth in energy supplies).
207
See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABILITY
INDEX: 2010 REPORT 9 (2010), available at http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/
20100525_Tort_Liability_Index_2010.pdf (discussing tort liability system as significant
factor in the decision of businesses to enter a state).
208
See Glaser, supra note 20, (manuscript at 47); see also Myron Ebell, Increase Access to
Energy, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST., Jan. 19, 2011, at 19, available at
http://cei.org/agenda-congress/increase-access-energy-0 (urging Congress to take various
steps to make energy more affordable).
209
See EUGENE M. TRISKO, ENERGY COST IMPACTS ON AMERICAN FAMILIES, 2001–2011
(2011), available at http://www.americaspower.org/sites/default/files/Energy_Cost_
Burdens_on_American_Families_2011.pdf.
210
See id. at 2.
211
See About Us, AFFORDABLE POWER ALLIANCE, http://www.affordablepoweralliance.
org/Aboutus.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
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EPA regulations on GHG emissions could cause gasoline and residential
electricity prices to increase by fifty percent and industry electricity and
natural gas prices to go up by seventy-five percent by 2030.212 EPA can
consider these impacts during its notice and comment rulemaking, but
courts cannot. Nor can courts consider the impact of their “regulations”
on government assistance programs, such as the Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Program, which would need to be increased
significantly if home-heating oil prices had to incorporate costs allegedly
related to global climate change.213
Should utilities not be able to generate sufficient electricity in
compliance with a court order, the brown-outs in California from a
decade ago can give a glimpse as to the impact an electricity shortage
could have on communities.214 During the March 2001 eight hour rolling
blackouts, the average electricity shutoff period was ninety minutes,
which was projected to translate into twenty hours of outage per
customer if the crisis were to continue over the summer.215 This
projected impact included a $4.6 billion reduction in household income
for Californians, a loss of nearly 136,000 jobs, and a $21.8 billion hit to the
gross state output.216 Fortunately, that crisis was avoided, in part, by the
ability of energy policymakers to make adjustments. Policymakers
would likely be hamstrung, though, if the brown-outs—whether more or
less drastic than those projected for the summer of 2001—were caused by
judicially-imposed limits that companies had to meet or be subject to
massive, additional liability.
Any such cost increases or energy shortages would have broad
ripple effects. This is why GHG emissions have been a focal point of
both national and international policymakers. If American businesses,
from manufacturers to service companies, had to adjust to more
expensive, less available energy, then they would be significantly
disadvantaged. Already, the recent rise in energy costs has taken its toll
on American companies’ ability to compete internationally.
The
See AFFORDABLE POWER ALLIANCE, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE EPA ENDANGERMENT
FINDING ON LOW INCOME GROUPS AND MINORITIES 1 (2010), available at
http://www.Affordablepoweralliance.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yXQwPRYFUF8%3D
&tabid=40.
213
See Jad Mouawad, Baby, It’s Going to Be Cold Outside, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at C1,
C6.
214
See, e.g., Rotational or Rolling Blackouts, CONSUMER ENERGY CENTER,
http://www.consumerenergycenter.org/tips/blackouts.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2012)
(discussing California’s recent history of rolling blackouts).
215
See AUS CONSULTANTS, IMPACT OF A CONTINUING ELECTRICITY CRISIS ON THE
CALIFORNIA ECONOMY ii (2001), available at http://www.caltax.org/member/taxletter/
Reference/AUSStudyfinal.pdf.
216
See id. at ii–iii.
212
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chemical industry, for example, was once dominated by American
businesses. But, as the Commerce Department has found, energy cost
increases “have eroded the U.S. chemicals industry’s competitive
position,”217 with the United States’ trade balance for chemicals declining
from $16.8 billion in net exports in 1997 to $218 million in net exports in
2006.218 “Chemical plants are closing in the United States, as companies
move their facilities and dollars to countries where natural gas is
cheaper, particularly to the Middle East where natural gas prices are a
fraction of prices in the United States.”219 Metal, pulp, and paper
industries have had similar experiences.220
Other sectors would be deeply affected, regardless of international
competition. Consider the energy sectors themselves, as the natural gas
industry alone employs over 600,000 workers directly and helps create
an estimated three million other American jobs.221 The transportation
industry would also be hit hard. Rising energy costs have been a
significant factor in the recent challenges facing the airline industry; and
for taxi cab and truck drivers whose incomes are modest, energy costs
constitute a significant part of their expenses. Here, judicially-mandated
reductions in GHGs could directly determine their economic viability.222
These and other impacts of whether and how to reduce GHGs,
which are central to U.S. energy policy, would not be before a court
when fashioning an abatement plan, granting injunctive relief, or
imposing billions of dollars of liability in tort cases over GHG emissions.
C. The Validation of “Regulation Through Litigation”?
The reason for the concern demonstrated in this Article over the
potential lawlessness of global climate change litigation and the
remedies that courts might impose is that these lawsuits lack the
217
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. INDUS.,
ENERGY POLICY AND U.S. INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS 5 (2007), available at
http://ita.doc.gov/td/energy/energy%20use%20by%20industry.pdf.
218
See id.
219
Id.
220
See id. at 6–7; see also id. at 7 (“High natural gas prices have led to the closure of all U.S.
direct-reduced iron steel mills.”). “From 2000 to 2005, the cost of fuels and purchased
electricity for the pulp and paper industry increased from $6.9 billion to $8.8 billion, a
[twenty-six] percent increase,” which has been attributed to “the closing of 232 mills and
loss of 182,000 jobs.” Id.
221
See AMERICA’S NATURAL GAS ALLIANCE, NATURAL GAS: WORKING FOR AMERICA,
available at http://www.anga.us/media/40995/us%20economy.pdf (“[T]he natural gas
industry supports [approximately] 2.8 million jobs in the United States.”).
222
See Glaser, supra note 20, (manuscript at 49) (discussing the importance of low energy
production costs for U.S. job growth during the 1980s and 1990s and how increased
competition from China has eroded this advantage).
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lynchpin that keeps all tort liability from being rudderless: objective
wrongdoing. The defendants are not being sued over a product defect or
negligent conduct, but because their products, like many other products
in modern society, have inherent characteristics that are an essential part
of the product or process itself.223 As a result, liability is determined by
factors outside the control of those forced to pay. Such super strict or
absolute liability is only available in an extremely narrow set of
circumstances, namely when one engages in abnormally dangerous
conduct. Courts have broadly rejected theories that would require
manufacturers, in essence, to be insurers of their products.224 This is
why, for example, courts do not subject beer manufacturers to liability
for drunk driving accidents or sugar producers to liability for tooth
decay or diabetes.
Robert Reich, who was President Clinton’s Secretary of Labor,
created a term in the 1990s for tort suits whose true purpose is political
change: “regulation through litigation.” The massive liability exposure
does not simply compensate a plaintiff, but regulates an industry. At
first, Secretary Reich favorably appreciated the power of such litigation
to achieve what he thought were important policy objectives. He soon
reversed course, however, calling the lawsuits “faux legislation, which
sacrifices democracy.”225 Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe, in
applying the regulation through litigation concept to global climate
change cases, editorialized against the litigation, saying “its very
identification as a judicially redressable source of injury cries out for the
response that the plaintiffs have taken their ‘petition for redress of

See Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel, Can Governments Impose
a New Tort Duty to Prevent External Risks? The “No-Fault” Theories Behind Today’s High-Stakes
Government Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923, 954 (2009).
224
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3d Cir. 2002)
(dismissing public-nuisance claims under Pennsylvania law); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 133 (Conn. 2001) (dismissing public-nuisance claims under Connecticut
law); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (dismissing
public-nuisance claims under Florida law); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821
N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (dismissing public-nuisance claims under Illinois law); City of
St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (“The city
alleges in its complaint that before 1978 the defendants ‘produced, manufactured,
processed, distributed, and marketed’ lead paint and pigment.”); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924
A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 203
(App. Div. 2003) (dismissing public-nuisance claims under New York law); State v. Lead
Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 434 (R.I. 2008) (“[T]he then Attorney General, on behalf of the
State of Rhode Island . . . filed suit against various former lead pigment
manufacturers . . . .”).
225
See Reich, supra note 183.
223
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grievances’ to the wrong institution altogether.”226
The Obama
administration (“The Administration”) underscored this point when its
Solicitor General submitted a brief to the Supreme Court to urge the
Court to grant certiorari in American Electric Power Co.
The
Administration explained that the Court should dismiss the suit because
the “regulatory approach is preferable to what would result if multiple
district courts—acting without the benefit of even the most basic
statutory guidance—could use common-law [tort] claims to sit as
arbiters of scientific and technology-related disputes and de facto
regulators of power plants and other sources of pollution.”227
These individuals, none of whom could be labeled as “conservative”
in their views on public policy, recognized that process matters in the
American legal system. The ends of achieving a policy goal or revenue
source, regardless of how desirous, do not justify the means of misusing
the hallowed American civil justice system, particularly when doing so
would cause undue hardship for American consumers and businesses.
Ruling otherwise would invite any group that fails to get its way in the
political arena to turn to the courts in hopes of finding a judge or
appellate panel to agree with its agenda and endorse its litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has historically embraced the American tort
system and, when rejecting preemption defenses, has argued for a
vibrant civil litigation system for compensating individuals harmed by
misconduct, and for correcting that misconduct. Given this public policy
backdrop, it is particularly noteworthy that the unanimous American
Electric Power Co. Court, led by Justice Ginsburg, chose to expound on
why tort litigation does not provide the tools for courts to decide
emission standards for GHGs. Rather, the Court was clear that global
issues of “this order” should rest entirely with the executive and
legislative branches.228 Lower courts should follow the Supreme Court’s
blueprint and reject climate change tort cases, regardless of the

226
Laurence H. Tribe, Joshua D. Branson & Tristan L. Duncan, Too Hot for Courts to
Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine 12 (Wash.
Legal
Found.,
Working
Paper
No.
169,
2010),
available
at
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf.
227
See Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority Supporting Petitioners at 1617, Am. Elec.
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (June 20, 2011) (No. 10-174).
228
See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–40 (2011) (concluding
that these issues should be left to the political branches because federal courts are ill
equipped to deal with these issues).
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combinations and permutations of plaintiffs and defendants or how
creative and inviting the pleadings may seem.
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